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enthusiasm and enlightenment:
faith and philosophy in the
thought of christian thomasius*
thomas ahnert
School of History and Classics, University of Edinburgh
“Enthusiasm” has been described as the intellectual opposite of the Enlightenment,
its “anti-self ”. It stood for a religion of the “heart” rather than the “head”, and
was associated with the extreme, millenarian sects on the fringes of established
Protestantism. The relationship between religious enthusiasm and enlightened
philosophy, however, could be closer than is often thought. Here I focus on the example
of the jurist and philosopher Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), who is considered to
be one of the first and most influential representatives of the early Enlightenment in
Protestant Germany. Usually, Thomasius is described as a sort of classical enlightened
thinker who separated the question of religious truth from the pursuit of secular
philosophy, and it is implied that the interpretation of Thomasius’s religious beliefs
contributes little, if anything, to the understanding of his philosophical views. His
religious views, however, not only were regarded by contemporaries as an example of
religious “enthusiasm”. These “enthusiastic” religious beliefs were also more important
to his philosophy than is often argued. They were part of a programme for religious and
intellectual renewal and reform which, Thomasius believed, would prepare the reform
of Lutheran philosophy from the obsolete, “scholastic” intellectual traditions it had
inherited from the papal church. This essay examines the often complex development
of Thomasius’s religious views in their historical context and their significance for his
wider “enlightened” intellectual interests.
This essay examines the importance of religion for the origins of the German
Enlightenment around 1700. In particular, I shall focus on a central figure
of early eighteenth-century intellectual history: the jurist and philosopher
Christian Thomasius (1655–1728). Now known mainly for his criticism of
witchcraft trials and judicial torture, Thomasius has long been regarded as
one of the first and most influential representatives of the early Enlightenment
* I should like to thank Professor Tony La Vopa and Dr Nicholas Phillipson for their very
helpful comments on a draft of this article.
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in the German territories.1 In the course of the famous debate on “What
is Enlightenment?”, to which Immanuel Kant contributed his well-known
essay, the writer Friedrich Gedike described Thomasius as the founder of the
Enlightenment in Germany, the philosopher to whom “we owe a large part of
our intellectual and material felicity”.2 A few years later Friedrich Schiller praised
him for his fearless opposition to scholastic “pedantry”.3 In recent scholarship
Thomasius continues to be credited with questioning the authority of obsolete,
“scholastic” learning and with contributing to an intellectual revival of German
universities after a period of decline following the end of the Thirty Years
War.4
As a religious thinker he is usually presented as a classical theorist of
the Enlightenment, who separated the question of religious truth from the
pursuit of secular philosophy. He is not considered an atheist, but it is widely
claimed that Thomasius’s secular philosophical positions were “independent”
of his religious beliefs. Werner Schneiders, for example, wrote that although
Thomasius’s philosophy was for a short time in the 1690s strongly influenced
by religious mysticism, this was no more than a passing phase. It reflected a
religious and psychological crisis, from which Thomasius recovered around 1700,
making it possible for him to return to a rationalist and secular philosophy.5 In
a recent important work Ian Hunter has argued that Thomasius’s aim was to
“detranscendentalize” political philosophy, that is, to separate it from the pursuit
of true faith by relegating religious belief to a private, spiritual relationship with
God which did not interfere with philosophy’s monopoly in worldly affairs.6
1 E. Bloch, “Christian Thomasius, ein deutscher Gelehrter ohne Misere”, in idem, Naturrecht
und menschliche Wu¨rde (Frankfurt am Main, 1985); W. Schneiders, Naturrecht und
Liebesethik (Hildesheim, 1971); F. Vollhardt, ed., Christian Thomasius (1655–1728): Neue
Forschungen im Kontext der Fru¨haufkla¨rung (Tu¨bingen, 1997); P. Schro¨der, Christian
Thomasius zur Einfu¨hrung (Dresden, 1999); Frank Grunert, Normbegru¨ndung und
politische Legitimita¨t: Zur Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie der deutschen Aufkla¨rung (Fru¨he
Neuzeit 57; Tu¨bingen, 2000); Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical
Philosophy in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge, 2001).
2 “Wir alle verdanken ihm einen großen Theil unserer intellektuellen und materiellen
Glu¨ckseeligkeit” (quoted in Martin Pott, “Christian Thomasius und Gottfried Arnold”, in
Dietrich Blaufuß and Friedrich Niewo¨hner, eds., Gottfried Arnold (1666–1714) [Wiesbaden,
1995], 247–65, 247).
3 See Schiller to Goethe, 29 May 1799, in S. Seidel, ed., Der Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller
und Goethe, vol. 2: Briefe des Jahre 1798–1805 (Munich, 1985), 213.
4 N. Hammerstein, Jus und Historie (Go¨ttingen, 1972); for a less pessimistic view see R. J.
W. Evans, “German Universities after the Thirty Years’ War”, in History of the Universities
I (1981), 169–89.
5 Schneiders, Naturrecht und Liebesethik, which remains one of the most important works
on the thought of Christian Thomasius.
6 Hunter, Rival Enlightenments.
enthusiasm and enlightenment 155
Frank Grunert has recently argued that Thomasius’s appeals to Scripture in
his philosophical works were rhetorical and prudential, rather than a sign of a
meaningful connection between his religion and his philosophy.7
Research has therefore concentrated on Thomasius’s supposedly “secular”
moral and political ideas, rather than on his religious thought.8 The emphasis
of this essay, however, will be on the nature and development of Thomasius’s
religious views, because these too are important for an understanding of his
significance for the intellectual history of the early German Enlightenment—
more important, perhaps, than has been thought before. There are two main
reasons for paying attention to Thomasius’s religious thought. One is that his
contemporaries often considered his writings to be controversial, not so much
because they were a-religious, but because they were heterodox, often appearing
dangerously close to a form of religious “enthusiasm”, which was associated with
politically and theologically subversive millenarian sects. This in itself makes
Thomasius’s religious views worth attention.
But Thomasius’s supposedly secular thought also has deeper roots in these
controversial religious beliefs and in his seemingly idiosyncratic arguments about
the nature of Christian faith than has previously been suggested. As we shall
see, faith and philosophy in Thomasius’s thought are more closely intertwined
than his well-established reputation as a champion of a secular Enlightenment
suggests. This raises important questions about the nature of the Enlightenment
in the German territories.
In recent years the notion of the Enlightenment as the story of the “rise of
modern paganism” and the transition to a modern secular society has been
questioned. A number of scholars have shown the extent to which religious
concerns formed an integral part of enlightened thought, well beyond the early
eighteenth century.9 David Sorkin, for example, has argued that there was a
7 F. Grunert, “Antiklerikalismus und christlicher Anspruch im Werk von Christian
Thomasius”, in J. Mondot, ed., Der Kampf der Aufkla¨rung: Kirchenkritik und Religionskritik
zur Aufkla¨rungszeit (Berlin, 2004), 41.
8 Two important exceptions are the articles by Friedrich de Boor, “Die ersten Vorschla¨ge
des Christian Thomasius ‘wegen Auffrichtung einer Neuen Academie zu Halle’ aus dem
Jahre 1690”, in E. Donnert, ed., Europa in der fru¨hen Neuzeit: Festschrift fu¨r Gu¨nther
Mu¨hlpfordt, vol. 4 (Weimar, 1997), and the article by H. Dreitzel, “Christliche Aufkla¨rung
durch fu¨rstlichen Absolutismus: Thomasius und die Destruktion des fru¨hneuzeitlichen
Konfessionsstaates”, in Vollhardt, ed., Christian Thomasius.
9 The description of the Enlightenment as the “rise of modern paganism” derives from
Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. Vol. 1: The Rise of Modern Paganism (New
York, 1966). Recent literature focusing on the continuing importance of religion includes,
e.g., H.-E. Bo¨deker, “Die Religio¨sita¨t der Gelehrten”, in K. Gru¨nder and H. Rengstorf,
eds., Religionskritik und Religio¨sita¨t in der deutschen Aufkla¨rung (Heidelberg, 1989); K.
Haakonssen, Enlightenment and Religion: Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century Britain
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“middle way” between a secular Enlightenment and traditional theology. This
was the “theological” or “religious Enlightenment”, which aimed to use modern,
rational thought to reform theology and bring it closer to the essence of religious
faith.10 Thomasius’s thought, however, was not an example of a “religious
Enlightenment” of this kind. His religious views were closer to the “enthusiasm”
that has been described as the “anti-self” of the Enlightenment than to the
moderate, rational theology associated with the “religious Enlightenment”.11 His
views were similar to those of the extreme millenarian sects on the fringes of
German Protestantism, which emphasized the importance of sincerity and the
believer’s heart over the authority of institutions, formulaic professions of faith
and subtle doctrinal argument. And yet, his “enthusiastic” views are closely
entwined with his ideas on history, moral philosophy, and the study of nature.
The first part of this essay deals with three stages in the complex development
of Thomasius’s religious ideas. The first of these, in the late 1680s and early 1690s,
is characterized by a voluntarist theology; the second, beginning in the early to
mid-1690s, reflected a shift to a more extreme position, which his contemporaries
suspected of being an example of religious “enthusiasm”; the third, from around
1703, is marked by an attempt to avoid some of the enthusiastic implications of his
earlier thought, though Thomasius’s religious beliefs remained highly heterodox
and continued to attract criticism from more conservative contemporaries. I
shall then examine the significance of Thomasius’s religious heterodoxy for his
“secular” philosophy and consider his views about the state of corruption into
which modern philosophy had fallen: a state of corruption which could only
be remedied by a reform of religious faith. For although faith and philosophy
were conceptually distinct, they were at the same time dependent on each
other.
Before turning to the examination of Thomasius’s religious views, it might be
helpful to provide a short biography.12 Christian Thomasius was born in January
1655 in Leipzig, the son of Jakob Thomasius, professor of Rhetoric and Moral
Philosophy at the local university. Raised as a Lutheran, he studied philosophy
(Cambridge, 1996); B. Young, Theological Debate in England, from Locke to Burke (Oxford,
1998); D. Sorkin, The Berlin Haskalah and German Religious Thought (London, 2000); M.
Doody, “The Mystics’ Enlightenment” (The Saintsbury Lecture, University of Edinburgh,
November 2002); Nigel Aston, Christianity and Revolutionary Europe (Cambridge, 2002).
10 Sorkin, The Berlin Haskalah, 17.
11 J. G. A. Pocock, “Enthusiasm: The Antiself of the Enlightenment”, in A. J. La Vopa and
L. Klein, eds., Enthusiasm and Enlightenment in Europe, 1650–1850 (San Marino, CA, 1998),
pp. 7–28, 11.
12 For a short introduction to Thomasius’s life, see R. Lieberwirth, “Christian Thomasius
(1655–1728)”, in G. Jerouschek and A. Sames, eds., Aufkla¨rung und Erneuerung (Hanau/
Halle, 1994).
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and law in Leipzig and Frankfurt an der Oder and began practising as an advocate
in his home town of Leipzig from the early 1680s, but soon turned to teaching
law to university students as a private lecturer. From the late 1680s Thomasius
became associated with Pietism, a quasi-Puritan reform movement within the
Lutheran church, whose aim was to return the church to a sincere, practical form
of Christianity. Like many Pietists he was expelled from the Electorate of Saxony
after disputes with the traditionalist theological faculty in Leipzig, and like them
he settled in the friendlier territories of the Calvinist Elector of Brandenburg,
eventually taking up a post teaching law at the newly founded university of Halle
in 1694. From the mid-1690s, however, Thomasius also found himself at odds with
one of the most prominent Pietists, August Hermann Francke, an educational
reformer and the founder of the orphanage and school in Glaucha near Halle.
The relationship remained uneasy until Francke’s death in 1727. Thomasius died
in the following year.
i. faith and the limits of philosophy: thomasius’s
theological voluntarism and the revival of piety
around 1690
Around the time of his expulsion from Leipzig in 1690 Thomasius’s thought
on the relationship between faith and rational philosophy was straightforwardly
voluntarist, in that he believed that divine nature and the decisions of the divine
will were inscrutable to human reason. Although God had revealed certain truths
to humanity in Scripture, these were of a different order from the truths of
philosophy, which were founded on natural reason. Philosophy, therefore, could
not be used for the explication of truths of faith. And yet, Thomasius wrote, this
was exactly what the “scholastics”, a broadly defined term, in which he included
his orthodox Lutheran opponents, had done. They had used philosophy like
pagans and had “attempted to deduce the mysteries of faith from philosophy,
and made philosophy the measure of theology”.13 The consequences had been
severe. Philosophy had distorted the proper understanding of faith and had
precipitated bitter and interminable theological disputes that would never be
resolved. For while the truths of revelation were, by themselves, self-evident and
easy to grasp, they were obscured by subtle metaphysical argument as soon as
philosophically minded theologians applied their skills to them.
13 “[H]i sunt fructus philosophiae gentilis, vel potius abusus, quod Scholastici mysteria fidei
ex philosophia deducere instituerunt, & philosophiam normam fecerunt Theologiae,
contra praeceptum Apostoli, qui Colossenses graviter monuit, ne patiantur se decipi per
philosophiam & inanem fallaciam” (C. Thomasius, Institutiones Jurisprudentiae Divinae
[Frankfurt/Leipzig, 1688], 109).
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Thomasius’s concerns had a long pedigree in Lutheran thought, dating at least
from the reintroduction of metaphysics into Protestant theological curricula at
the end of the sixteenth century, if not to Luther himself.14 But they also coincided
with those of Pietist reformers in his own time. In Leipzig in 1689, inspired by
Pietist figures such as August Hermann Francke, students of theology had burnt
their philosophy lecture notes.15 Phillip Jakob Spener, from whose Pia desideria of
1675 “Pietism” derived its name, complained, like Thomasius, that theology had
been corrupted by “much that is extraneous, useless and smacks more of worldly
wisdom”—that is, philosophy.16 Indeed, Spener thought that the confusion of
faith and philosophy was a strategy of Satan to divide Christians into conflicting
theological sects, which would quarrel over artificial doctrinal distinctions and
ignore the charity Christ expected from his followers. For Pietists like Spener,
abandoning metaphysical argument in theology would end the corruption
of doctrine and restore the active piety that was the essence of Christian
faith.17
Thomasius aimed to separate faith and philosophy, for much the same
reasons as Spener.18 Christian faith and charity had suffered from the mixture
of philosophy and theology.19 Like Spener, he emphasized the limitations of
human reason in relation to the divine, taking up a position like that of
other contemporary theological voluntarists such as, for example, Robert Boyle
in England or Samuel Pufendorf.20 His scepticism about the usefulness of
reason, however, raised questions about the validity of established orthodox
Lutheran theological debate. Orthodox Lutheran theorists such as Valentin
14 On the reintroduction of metaphysics into Protestant university curricula, see Max Wundt,
Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Tu¨bingen, 1939); W. Sparn, Wiederkehr
der Metaphysik (Stuttgart, 1976).
15 H. Leube, “Die Geschichte des Pietismus”, in idem, Orthodoxie und Pietismus: Gesammelte
Schriften (Bielefeld, 1975), 182.
16 “[V]iel frembdes/unnuetzes und mehr nach der weltweißheit schmeckendes” (Jakob
Spener, “Pia desideria”, in idem, Philipp Jakob Spener: Schriften, vol. 1 [Hildesheim/New
York, 1979], 23).
17 Ibid., 5–6.
18 Thomasius, De felicitate subditorum Brandenburgicorum (Halle, 1749), §VII: “[L]eguntur
scripta Domini Speneri . . .praecipue vero ejusdem pia desideria, . . . quibus eo major
applausus datur a desiderantibus redintegrationem sanctitatis Christianae, quo majori
conatu ringunt, & ora distorquent Pseudo–Apostoli”.
19 “[P]lurima ex scriptis humanis, paucissima ex verbo Dei proferrent, loco Theologicarum
doctrinarum Philosophicas inculcarent, & ad quemlibet locum quamlibet controversiam
obtorto collo traherent, ut solum prurigini litigandi, calumniandi, atque disputandi
possent satisfacere” (ibid., §VIII).
20 See J. Wojcik, Boyle and the Limits of Reason (Cambridge, 1997). On Pufendorf’s theological
voluntarism, see the conclusion of this essay.
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Alberti were prepared to grant a more extensive role to philosophical argument
in theological debate. Even though the human intellect was weak, and weakened
further by original sin, it was assumed that human reason was similar in
kind to the divine intellect and could form at least some conclusions on
divine matters.21 Indeed, such beliefs sustained philosophical and theological
teaching in the curricula of orthodox Lutheran universities like that of
Leipzig.
It is not surprising that Thomasius’s views were considered provocative by
orthodox Lutherans, and sympathetic by leading Pietists. From the mid-1690s,
however, Thomasius moved towards a position which appeared to many of his
contemporaries to be even more extreme, and which eventually also drew the
criticism of a number of leading Pietist theologians, including August Hermann
Francke.
ii. thomasius’s religious enthusiasm (i): the response
of the orthodox
In the early to mid-1690s Thomasius redefined the relationship between faith
and philosophy in a way that earned him the reputation of being a religious
“enthusiast”. They were changes which involved rethinking both his notion
of faith and his anthropology, two entities which were closely related to each
other.
Of central importance to both Thomasius’s faith and his anthropology was
the question of the freedom of the human will. In his early works, such as the
Institutes of Divine Jurisprudence of 1688, Thomasius had followed Pufendorf in
arguing that the essence of the human will was the freedom to choose between
any of the available courses of action. This, however, raised a difficult question
about the nature of free agency. If the will was capable of acting entirely freely
and indifferently towards any course of action, what was the reason for its choice
of one action over another? On the other hand, if something did determine its
decision, how could it be described as free? Several other philosophers, such as
Hobbes or Leibniz, had developed their own responses to this classic problem,
and in 1723 Christian Wolff was expelled from his post at the University of Halle
for holding the view that every decision of the will was determined by a sufficient
reason, a view that seemed to deny the freedom of the will, which was essential
to moral imputability; it is alleged that Frederick William I was persuaded to
banish Wolff when he was informed that Wolff’s doctrine made it impossible to
21 V. Alberti, Compendium Iuris Naturae Orthodoxae Theologiae Conformatum, 2nd edn
(Leipzig, 1696).
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punish deserters from his army, because they could not be held responsible for
their crime.22
Thomasius’s conclusion in the early 1690s was that the essence of the will was
not that it encapsulated an ability to choose, as he had believed before, but was a
form of love (amor), which he defined as a desire or passion for a particular end, a
radically different concept from his earlier, Pufendorfian notion of an indifferent
will. The nature of volition as amor explained its motive force. There were many
varieties of this amor in human nature which were, in essence, different wills,
competing with each other for the control of human actions. Each of these wills
was directed to a different end, but it was impossible for humans to choose
freely between these wills. They were, so to speak, hard-wired in human nature,
although their proportionate strengths differed from one individual to the next.
They could only be changed by transforming the very nature of the person.
Thomasius combined his new conception of the will as a form of love with
Augustinian conceptions of religious faith as love for God, which was opposed
to the love for the world of the godless. His immediate source for these was
French Jansenist writings and the works of mystical theologians, in which he had
been developing an increasing interest. Many of the comments on the will as a
form of love, for example, are reminiscent of the writings of the Jansenist Jacques
Abbadie, whose works were to be found in Thomasius’s personal library.23 One
of the most important pieces in which he put forward his new interpretation of
faith was a sympathetic introduction to a work by the French mystic Pierre Poiret,
On Solid, Superficial and False Erudition (De Eruditione Solida, Superficiaria et
Falsa).24 He also strongly praised the mystic and ecclesiastical historian Gottfried
Arnold,25 as well as many other similar figures, such as the theologian Christian
Hoburg, the author of numerous spiritualist works.26
Thomasius identified four basic types of volition or amor, each of which stood
for the desire for a particular end. Three of these were corrupt and oriented
exclusively towards worldly goods: avarice, which was directed towards material
22 B. Bianco, “Freiheit gegen Fatalismus: Zu Joachim Langes Kritik an Wolff”, in N. Hinske,
ed., Zentren der Aufkla¨rung. Vol. 1. Halle: Aufkla¨rung und Pietismus (Heidelberg, 1989),
111–55.
23 On Thomasius’s increasing interest in French literature on amour raisonnable, see
R. Lieberwirth, “Die franzo¨sischen Kultureinflu¨sse auf den deutschen Fru¨haufkla¨rer
Christian Thomasius”, Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin-Luther-Universita¨t Halle-
Wittenberg (Gesell. Reihe) 33 (1984), 63–73. On French Jansenist authors, cf. S. James,
Passion and Action (Oxford, 1997), chap. 10.
24 Thomasius, “Dissertatio ad Petri Poireti libros de Eruditione”, in Programmata
Thomasiana (Halle/Leipzig, 1724 [1694]).
25 See Pott, “Christian Thomasius und Gottfried Arnold”, 255.
26 Thomasius praises Hoburg at the end of chap. 6 in his Versuch vom Wesen des Geistes,
2nd edn (Halle, 1709).
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wealth; ambition, directed towards external honour; and lust, which was directed
to all forms of physical pleasure. The fourth, “reasonable love” (amor rationalis),
was identical to Christian faith. It represented the longing for God and, in the state
of innocence, had been powerful enough to control the three corrupt desires but
had been weakened by original sin and was now too feeble to prevent humanity
from falling into depravity.
This capacity for faith in the sense of amor rationalis and the three corrupt
forms of amor was rooted in human nature, which Thomasius said consisted of
three parts: the first was the body; the second was the soul (anima), which was
the seat of the three corrupt passions; and the third was the spirit (spiritus), in
which the love of God was based. The crucial difference between soul and spirit,
anima and spiritus, was that the former was part of nature while the latter was
supra-natural, a divine spark within humans which did not perish in death but
returned to God.
Thomasius thought that although the spirit had lost its control over the
passions in the anima through original sin, this control could be re-established
after a lengthy process of regeneration, which could be completed only with the
supra-natural intervention of divine grace. Natural reason, which was located in
the anima, could begin this process of regeneration by allowing us to recognize
the particular misery of the human condition, and to understand our inability
to change our condition. But natural reason could not, on its own, suppress the
corrupt passions in the anima, nor could it return the reasonable love of God
in the spirit to its pre-lapsarian strength. This could only be accomplished by
God directly, by an immediate supra-natural gift of divine grace, which would
be given as a reward for sincere contrition and a yearning to escape from the
misery of the post-lapsarian state. The consequence of this regeneration would
be to restore the capacity for faith, and virtue and felicity as well. Humans would
be freed from the distractions of the corrupt passions, and from the temptation
to pursue false goods without true or lasting felicity.27
An important implication of Thomasius’s new anthropology and view of faith
was to render doctrines superfluous to religious belief, and it was this that exposed
him to the charge of enthusiasm. Orthodox theorists objected that Thomasius’s
view of regeneration presented conversion to the true faith as the result of a direct
communication between the individual and God, which was only made possible
by the presence of a spark of the divine essence in human nature. As a result,
the clear distinction between God and his creation was removed and the two
were conflated in a way that was suspect of “Spinozism”. By positing a particle of
divine, and therefore uncreated, essence in each human, it was argued, Thomasius
27 Thomasius, “Dissertatio ad Petri Poireti libros de Eruditione solida, superficiaria et falsa”,
in Programmata Thomasiana; idem, Ausu¨bung der Sittenlehre, 4th edn (Halle, 1708), 521.
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turned created beings into a part of God himself. Thomasius’s argument was
seen as a typically enthusiastical interpretation of the world as an emanation
of God’s essence, rather than as his creation. Valentin Lo¨scher, one of the most
eminent orthodox Lutheran theologians of the time, complained in his Deismus
Fanaticorum that the belief “that there is a divine particle in every creature”
reflected the enthusiasts’ identification of the world and God.28 In Greifswald
the orthodox theologian Justus Wesselus Rumpaeus noted that, like Thomasius,
“all Fanatics who have ever existed defended the opinion that God created this
universe and whatever is in it out of himself or out of his essence”.29
By emphasizing divine inspiration Thomasius thus appeared to dispense
with the role of Christ and doctrine as necessary mediators between God and
man. If regeneration was brought about by direct interaction between God
and man, there was no need for his Son, and no need for revealed Scripture
to direct humans towards the salvificatory faith. Orthodox Lutherans rejected
Thomasius’s anthropology, insisting that human nature had no divine third
part, no spiritus, to provide humans with the “illumination” needed to give
them direct contact with God. Believers, the orthodox held, were enlightened
by understanding and accepting the doctrinal truths revealed in Scripture, not
by God directly. Thomasius’s belief in the Christus internus as the divine spark
within, the orthodox Wittenberg theologian Wernsdorfer believed, made the
revealed word redundant. “Therefore the word, Christ, the spirit, the seed, the
light, the Gospel, according to the Fanatics, are all one and the same.”30
Thomasius believed, however, that doctrine was ineffectual to achieve faith.
Faith depended on the redirection of the will from the corrupt love of the world
to the pure love of God. Doctrines were opinions adopted by the intellect, but
Thomasius’s new anthropology downplayed the importance of the intellect in
relation to the will-as-desire. This will, not the intellect, was the driving force
28 “[I]n qualibet creatura particulam divinam esse” (Valentin Lo¨scher (praeses), G. R. Habbius
(respondens), Deismus Fanaticorum (Wittenberg, 1708), 11). In a later passage in the same
piece (16) Lo¨scher referred to Thomasius’s Versuch vom Wesen des Geistes as an example
of this fanaticism. Deists, to Lo¨scher, are those “[o]mnia, qui fingunt, esse creata Deum”
(cf. the poem by Fr. Strunzius to the respondens). See also Valentin Lo¨scher’s Unschuldige
Nachrichten, vol. 3 (Wittenberg, 1704), 805, where Thomasius’s Versuch vom Wesen des
Geistes is presented as an example of this “fanatical” belief in the world as “nichts anders
als dessen [i.e. God’s] ausgegangenes Wesen”.
29 “Fanatici omnes, quotquot unquam existerunt, hanc defenderunt sententiam, Deum ex se
ipso, sive ex sua essentia, hoc universum, & quicquid est in eo, creasse” (Justus Wesselus
Rumpaeus [praeses], D. Harder [respondens], Ex Loco de Imagine Dei Quaestionum
Recentiorum imprimis Pietisticarum Pentadem [Greifswald, 1705], 8).
30 “Verbum igitur, Christus, spiritus, semen, lumen, Evangelium, stylo Fanaticorum, sunt
unum & idem” (G. Wernsdorfer [praeses], J. A. Hillig [respondens], De Verbo Dei Scripto,
sive Scriptura Sacra [Wittenberg, 1708], 14).
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of human nature; the intellect was merely an instrument in fulfilling the desires
determined by the will, not its guide. Doctrine, therefore, could do nothing to
turn the will from the corrupt love of temporal goods to the pure love of God.
From about 1693 Thomasius had also begun to doubt that there could be
such a thing as a single true Christian doctrine at all. In his earlier writings
he had still assumed the existence of a body of Christian doctrine, simple and
evident and based on scriptural revelation, whose meaning would become clear
once philosophy had been banned from theological debate. From the mid-1690s,
however, Thomasius denied even the existence of this simple doctrine. The reason
for this was that the subject of doctrines was God and the divine mysteries, which
were incomprehensible to human understanding. He now concluded that no
doctrinal opinions could be an accurate representation of God’s attributes or
of mysteries such as the Holy Trinity. For even if these doctrines were based on
divine revelation, it had been presented and adapted to a weak and limited human
understanding by the Creator. Doctrinal opinions were only metaphors, which
were derived from things familiar to humans and represented their divine objects
“improperly and imperfectly”.31 No metaphor, therefore, was ever exclusively
true. Metaphors could be false, because they could be misleading, but it was also
possible for several different metaphors to be used to signify the same mystery of
faith. “Orthodoxy” in the proper sense of the word, an exclusively true belief, thus
did not exist, because there were several ways to conceive of the divine mysteries,
which ultimately were beyond human comprehension. The love and veneration
of God, which was the essence of faith, could be expressed in many different
opinions or doctrines, all of which were equally valid, if they were professed
with a sincere heart. The purpose of Scripture was not to provide humans with
doctrines, but to be a sort of manual of regeneration, which informed humans
of the origins and nature of their corruption and the nature of its remedies.
Orthodox Lutherans considered Thomasius’s arguments to be typical of
millenarian, enthusiastic sects such as the Quakers or the Philadelphic societies,
who rejected the formulaic faith of established churches in favour of a “living”
or “spiritual” faith of the heart. Although the orthodox generally agreed that
doctrine was not alone sufficient for faith, “faith”, however sincere, that was
not guided by true doctrine was blind. An important distinction made by the
orthodox in this context was that between fides quae creditur and fides qua creditur.
The fides quae creditur (“faith that is believed”) were the doctrines based on
Scripture; fides qua creditur (“faith with which a belief is held”) represented the
trust in God and the sincerity with which a person believed in these doctrines.
Sincere faith, the orthodox argued, required both. As Gustav Philipp Mo¨rl wrote,
31 Thomasius, “Dissertatio ad Petri Poireti Libros de Eruditione” (1694) in Programmata
Thomasiana, §19.
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“true faith was never found without love towards God, nor love towards God
without true faith”.32 However, enthusiasts like Thomasius, the orthodox claimed,
reduced faith to a pure fides qua creditur, a trust or love that was not guided by
doctrinal beliefs. “We should beware”, Mo¨rl warned, “how the Devil could try to
subvert our faith by spreading this dogma.”33 According to Joachim Fecht, “our
reverence must not be stupid [brutus], such that we revere God and Christ, but
are ignorant, who he is, whom we revere, or how we should revere him or why;
instead it must be with the mind and the understanding”.34 And in the words of
Albrecht Christian Roth, a preacher at the Leipzig Nicolaikirche and adversary
of Thomasius throughout the 1690s, faith required first knowledge (notitia) of
its message, then assent by the intellect (assensus). The recognition of scriptural
truth then led to trust in God (fiducia).35
iii. thomasius’s religious enthusiasm (ii): the response
of the pietists
It was not only orthodox Lutherans, however, who considered Thomasius’s
change of mind a case of religious enthusiasm. Even Pietists were keen to distance
themselves from Thomasius’s recent, more extreme views. However critical
Pietists were of traditional Lutheranism, they did not agree with Thomasius’s
complete “enthusiastic” abandonment of orthodox doctrine as a standard of true
faith.
This is brought out particularly clearly in the disputes initiated by Johann
Friedrich Mayer’s critique of Pietism, the Report of a Swedish Theologian on
the Pietists in 1706,36 in which Mayer accused the Halle theological faculty
of “enthusiasm”. Within a year both the Halle theological faculty and August
Hermann Francke had published replies, in which they claimed their own
teachings to be impeccably orthodox. They rejected the very term “Pietists”,
32 “[A]pud nos in confesso sit, nunquam inveniri veram fidem sine amore Dei, nec amorem
Dei sine vera fide” (Anon. [G. P. Mo¨rl], Repetitio Doctrinae Orthodoxae [Leipzig, 1697],
§XI).
33 “[A]ttendamus . . . quomodo Diabolus per hoc dogma nostram fidem evertere possit”
(ibid., §XI).
34 “Nec enim cultus noster brutus esse debet, ut tantum colamus DEum & Christum,
ut ignari, quis sit, quem colamus, aut quomodo colamus, aut cur colamus, sed debet
esse λoγικoς & rationalis” (J. Fecht, Scrutinium profligatae ex Ecclesia Haeretificationis,
Godofredo Arnoldo oppositum [Rostock/Leipzig, 1714], 39).
35 A. C. Roth, Thomasius portentosus (Leipzig, 1700), 63–4.
36 Johann Friedrich Mayer, Eines Schwedischen Theologi Kurtzer Bericht von Pietisten Samt
denen Ko¨niglichen Schwedischen EDICTEN wider dieselben (Leipzig, 1706). Although
Mayer, an orthodox theologian at the University of Greifswald, published the report
anonymously, the identity of the author was soon known.
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saying that their opponents should consider “the unspeakable harm which has
been done with the phrase ‘Pietists’” and avoid it.37 They were outraged that
theologians like Spener and Francke had been described as “the most terrible
enthusiasts and seducers”.38
Mayer had accused the theologians in Halle of locating faith “not in the
intellect, but exclusively in the human will”,39 of denying Scripture to be God’s
word,40 of questioning the existence of heresy41 and of believing that salvation was
possible without Christ’s meritum on the basis of the holiness of life achieved as a
result of regeneration.42 Ultimately, he had written, this amounted to defending
the sufficiency of good works in attaining salvation.43 Whether they admitted it
or not, the Pietist theologians in Halle were enthusiasts.
All of these accusations, the Halle theologians protested, were unfounded.
They declared that they believed faith to be fides quae creditur, though it had to
be adopted sincerely in order to bring about the regeneration of the will.44 One
of their main quarrels with orthodox Lutherans was that the latter’s emphasis
on justification through faith alone was excessive and instilled a false sense of
security in believers. By saying that good works were not necessary for salvation,
orthodox theologians led their congregations to believe that faith was not even
necessarily accompanied by good works. Good works, the Halle theologians
insisted, were not meritorious or efficacious with respect to salvation, but once
a person had been truly converted he or she inevitably performed good works,
because faith effected the regeneration of the believer’s nature.45 Insisting on good
works, therefore, did not mean that they were held to be sufficient for salvation.
37 “[W]as fuer unbeschreiblich vieles Unheil aus der Redens-Art/ Pietisten/ herkomme”
(Der Theologischen Faculta¨t auf der Universita¨t zu Halle Verantwortung gegen Hn. D. Joh.
Fried. Mayers/ Professoris Theologi auf der Universita¨t Greiffswald/ unter dem Namen eines
Schwedischen Theologi herausgegebenen so genannten kurtzen Bericht von Pietisten [Halle,
1707], 23).
38 “[D]ie allergreulichsten Schwaermer und Verfuehrer” (ibid., 22).
39 Ibid., 74 (“ . . . weil sie auch den Glauben durchaus nicht im Verstande/ sondern bloß in
dem Willen des Menschen suchen”).
40 Ibid., 56.
41 Ibid., 81–2.
42 Ibid., 100.
43 Ibid., 103.
44 Ibid., 76–7. Francke similarly defended himself, writing that Scripture was always “his
rule and measure” (“Regul und Bleymaß”; August Hermann Francke, Aufrichtige und
gruendliche Beantwortung eines an ihn abgelassenen und hierbey abgedruckten Send-
Schreibens eines Christl. Theologi der Professorum Theologiae zu Halle und seine eigene
Orthodoxie in der Lehre I. Von der Rechtfertigung II. Von der wahren und realen Gottseligkeit
Und III. Wie deren Grund allein in Christo zu legen sey betreffend [Halle, 1706], 42).
45 See Der Theologischen Faculta¨t auf der Universita¨t zu Halle Verantwortung, 106: the
orthodox say: “Gute Wercke sind nicht noethig zu Erlangung der Seligkeit, davon aber
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It meant that a person who professed to be Christian but did not perform good
works could not be sincere.46 Paul Anton, one of the leading figures of the Pietist
movement in Leipzig and later in Halle, wrote that “living faith is not without
the effort to perform good works, but faith justifies man before God without the
assistance of our works”.47
In his critique Mayer often referred to Thomasius, who, he wrote, “had
defended the cause of many main enthusiasts against the orthodox”.48 Also,
together with his students Enno Brenneysen and Jakob Friedrich Ludovici,
Thomasius had written in defence of indifferentism,49 mocked doctrinal
orthodoxy and asserted that pagans could be saved without believing in Christ.50
In addition he had rejected the fides quae creditur altogether and maintained that
saving grace was a matter of the will, not the intellect.51 In effect, Mayer equated
Thomasius’s position with that of the Halle theological faculty.
The Halle theologians’ response to this was to distance themselves from
Thomasius by protesting that Thomasius and his students were jurists, over
whom the Halle theological faculty had no influence. Although the works of
some of the jurists who had offended the orthodox (such as Johann Samuel
Stryck’s De Jure Sabbathi) had been printed at the Halle orphanage’s press, the
Halle theological faculty was not responsible for them because the orphanage
nichts gedencken/ wie es also zu verstehen/ daß keine wirckende oder vedienstliche Ursache
der Seligkeit in den guten Wercken zu suchen oder zu setzen sey/ jedoch sey es an dem/
daß der allein seligmachende Glaube diese Eigenschafft habe/ daß er freylich nach vorher
gegangener wahrer Bekehrung/ und nach der Vergebung der Suenden aus pur lauter
Gnaden/ auch die guten Fruechte hervor bringen muesse.”
46 Cf., for example, Francke, Aufrichtige und gru¨ndliche Beantwortung, 23–4: “wir . . .
bezeugen/ . . . daß die Busse und der Glaube der Menschen rechtschaffen und ungeheuchelt
sey/ und die Rechtfertigung auch ihre Frucht beweise in einem geaenderten Sinn und
gottseligen Leben und Wandel”.
47 “Fides viva non est absque bonorum operum studio; sed justificat oram [sic, =coram?]
Deo absque nostrorum operum subsidio” (Paul Anton, Disputatio Hallensis prima de
harmonia fidei quae justificat, & fidei, quatenus justificare dicitur [Halle, 1702], 48).
48 “Wie dem auch gedachter Thomasius in seiner Historia Sapientiae & Stultitiae
vieler Haupt-Schwaermer Sache wieder die Rechtglaeubigen vertheidiget hat” (Der
Theologischen Faculta¨t auf der Universita¨t zu Halle Verantwortung, 82).
49 Johann Friedrich Ludovici had published an Untersuchung des Indifferentismi Religionum
(s.l., 1700) under the pseudonym Eric Fridlibius (= “Eric Peacelove”). Brenneisen was
respondens for several university disputations by Thomasius, such as the De Jure Principis
circa Adiaphora (Halle, 1695).
50 Der Theologischen Faculta¨t auf der Universita¨t zu Halle Verantwortung, 87.
51 “[D]ie Pietisten einer goettlichen Lehre den Namen des Glaubens durchaus nicht geben
wollen/ weil sie auch den Glauben durchaus nicht im Verstande/ sondern bloß in dem
Willen des Menschen suchen und setzen/ siehe des Haellischen Professoris Thomasii ...”
(ibid., 74).
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press was the university press. Censorship was a matter for the faculty whose
member published the work, not for the director of the orphanage—that is,
August Hermann Francke.52 In its defence, the faculty could point to the fact
that Breithaupt, one of their professors of theology, had criticized Thomasius in
1697 for claiming that it was impossible to establish doctrinal criteria on which to
decide questions of heresy.53 Thomasius had become the cause of deep irritation
for the Halle theologians. In 1700 Francke and Breithaupt had written a letter to
Thomasius in which they criticized him for encroaching on theological matters
in his law lectures and interpreting Scripture independently in public, something
only trained theologians were permitted to do. They also claimed that he mocked
theologians and led his students astray, encouraging them to stay away from
church, avoid confession and scorn the truths of salvificatory faith.54
iv. the retreat from enthusiasm
Although Thomasius never succumbed to his critics, the charge of enthusiasm
was sufficiently serious for him to clarify his notion of religious faith a second time
from the early 1700s onward. The main reason why his previous view seemed
so close to enthusiasm was that he had argued that faith required the supra-
natural gift of divine grace, which made regeneration and life lived under the rule
of the divine spirit, the spiritus, possible. Regeneration thus was a miraculous
event, because the spiritus was not part of nature and there could be no “natural
method of moving from the state of foolishness to that of wisdom, but all
improvement would be supra-natural and by miracle”.55 As regeneration took
place by a miracle, it had to remain mysterious to anyone but the person who
had directly experienced it within him- or herself. This mystery of regeneration,
however, opened the door to enthusiasts’ claims of being directly inspired by God
in a way that was unverifiable by others.56 “Gradually”, Thomasius wrote in 1708,
52 Ibid., 139.
53 See, e.g., his statement that “[s]acra Scriptura iis constet vocibus & locutionibus, quae
quam accommodatissime sint ad exprimenda ejusmodi notationes, per quas objectum
infinitum concipiatur notitia in tantum positiva & vera, in quantum hanc Spiritus Sanctus
in nobis, ut est captus hominum, producendam intendit . . . ” (Justus Joachim Breithaupt,
Observationes Theologicae de Haeresi juxta S. Scripturae Sensum [Halle, 1697], 11).
54 C. Hinrichs, Preußentum und Pietismus (Go¨ttingen, 1971), 378–9.
55 “[N]ulla esset methodus transeundi ad statum sapientiae a statu stultitiae, sed omnis
& tota emendatio esset plane supranaturalis ac miraculosa” (C. Thomasius, Dissertatio
nova ad Petri Poireti libros de eruditione triplici of 1708, §XXX, repr. in Programmata
Thomasiana).
56 Thomasius refers to Locke’s comment on enthusiasm that “[e]very Conceit that thoroughly
warms our Fancies must pass for an Inspiration, if there be nothing but the strength of
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“I was convinced by various observations that this path was highly dangerous
and led to enthusiasm.”57
From around 1700, therefore, Thomasius tried to find a middle way between
traditional orthodoxy, which he continued to oppose, and enthusiasm.58
This middle way, however, differed from the type of moderate and rational
“religious Enlightenment” described by David Sorkin, which combined
a confident philosophical rationalism with the acceptance of scriptural
revelation.59 Thomasius’s compromise between orthodox superstition and
fanatical enthusiasm was not based on a particularly confident belief in the
powers of natural reason. He retained his belief in the primacy of the human
will over the intellect, which meant that reason followed, rather than guided,
the impulses of the will. As long as the will was not reformed, therefore, reason
would remain the instrument of its corrupt desires. It was not in itself and never
could be a self-sufficient standard of truth and virtue.
Thomasius also continued to argue that this reform of the will was brought
about by its regeneration, and that regeneration was a gift of divine grace.
The difference, however, between this form of regeneration and his earlier
“enthusiastic” beliefs was that Thomasius now considered regeneration to be
a natural rather than a supra-natural process. This change required first of all
a modification of his anthropology, in particular the rejection of his previous
belief in a tripartite human essence (material body, anima and spiritus) in which
a divine spirit, having been miraculously illuminated by God, was able to suppress
the corrupt passions in the second part, the anima. The distinction between the
natural anima and the supra-natural spiritus, in particular, he said, had been the
foundation of the other errors of his earlier, quasi-enthusiastic view.60 This was an
important concession to his orthodox critics, who had rejected the notion of the
tripartite nature of man as one of the principal errors in Thomasius’s thought;61
our Perswasion” (John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 5th edn [London,
1706], Bk IV, chap. XIX, §14). Thomasius refers to this passage in Locke’s Essay in §XXV
of his Dissertatio nova ad Petri Poireti libros de eruditione triplici of 1708 (see n. 55 above).
57 “[V]ariis obervationibus pedetentim convictus essem, periculosam valde esse hanc
viam, & ad Enthusiasmum ducere . . . ”(Thomasius, Dissertatio nova, §XXXIV).
58 In a preface to an edition of Grotius’s De Jure Belli ac Pacis of 1707, for example, Thomasius
criticized both orthodoxy and enthusiasm (Christian Thomasius, “Vorrede”, in Hugo
Grotius, Drey Bu¨cher vom Recht des Krieges und des Friedens [Leipzig, 1707]).
59 Sorkin, The Berlin Haskalah, 16–17.
60 Thomasius commented on this in a footnote to §22 of the 1724 edition of his Preface to
Poiret’s Dissertatio (in the Programmata Thomasiana).
61 Roth, Thomasius portentosus, 39: “est hic error de homine ejusque tribus partibus
inter πρωτα ψευδα Thomasii & inter principales, ex quo fere sequentes omnes pro-
manant”.
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Valentin Lo¨scher had denounced it as “the delight of all fanatics”.62 Thomasius
now argued that human nature was bipartite and consisted of a material body and
a spiritual anima, both of which were natural entities, not sparks of an uncreated
divine essence trapped in human nature.63
As before, regeneration was not an achievement of human philosophical
reasoning, but granted by God. It required, of course, the co-operation of
the human being concerned, but it was never within the power of humans to
acquire it. Regeneration, Thomasius wrote, came with prayers, meditation and
sincere contrition: “Pray to God . . . that he direct your actions with his grace
and providence, that you may attain the desired end by achieving felicity.”64
If there was a formula for imploring God for wisdom and temporal felicity, it
lay in the Lord’s Prayer,65 though formulae themselves were never enough:66
“before God, the scrutinizer of hearts, sighs effect more than prolixity”.67 For,
in the last resort, wisdom was a “habit of divine virtue and the most subtle
spirit”, which was attracted “by the magnet of prayer, so to speak”, and through
which “foolishness in us is suffocated and bound”.68 As for Scripture, it was still
to be regarded as a sort of manual for regeneration which drew attention to the
62 “Huc pervulgata illa sent. de tribus per naturam hominis partibus, spiritu, anima &
corpore, fanaticorum omnium deliciae” (Valentin Lo¨scher, Deismus Fanaticorum
[Wittenberg, 1708]). Justus Rumpaeus at Greifswald criticized Thomasius for the same
reason in a dissertation De Imagine Dei (Justus W. Rumpaeus [praeses], D. Harder
[respondens], Ex Loco de Imagine Dei [Greifswald, 1705], Quaestio IV, 15).
63 This change in Thomasius’s religious thought and anthropology occurred between about
1703 and 1705. This is evident from the 4th edn of his Fundamenta Juris Naturae et Gentium.
There, in a footnote in the Caput Prooemiale, he observed that “in the first dictations of
this chapter” in 1703 he had still distinguished a good divine spirit and an evil natural
spirit in humans (Fundamenta Juris Natura et Gentium, 4th edn [Halle, 1718], 3). When
the Fundamenta were first published in 1705, however, he had already revised his view and
rejected the idea of a separate divine spiritus in humans (ibid., I, III, §77 ff.) “I no longer
teach that man is composed of a good and an evil spirit, nor that rational love is a fourth
passion, properly distinct from lust, avarice and ambition, but that it [rational love] is a
tempered mixture of these three” (Thomasius, Fundamenta Juris Naturae et Gentium, 4th
edn, “Caput Prooemiale”, §XXI, footnote).
64 “[O]ra Deum, . . . ut actiones tuas dirigat gratia sua & providentia, quo finem optatum in
acquirenda felicitate adipiscaris” (Thomasius, Cautelae circa Praecognita Jurisprudentiae
[Halle, 1710], cap. II, §23).
65 Ibid., §35.
66 Ibid., §36.
67 “[A]pud Deum, tanquam cordium scrutatorem, plus operentur suspiria, quam
multiloquium” (ibid., §32).
68 “Etsi enim sapientia tanquam habitus virtutis divinae, & subtilissimus Spiritus, penetrans
omnia etiam Spiritus subtiles, (Sap.c. 7 v. 23) necessario prope sit omnibus hominibus,
nemini tamen se obtrudit, neminemque cogit, sed attrahitur quasi magnete orationis, &
conservatur, simul vero stultitia in nobis suffocatur & ligatur” (ibid., footnote a).
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corrupt nature of humans, its causes in the will, and its remedy, divine grace. “The
student of wisdom will find no better book, which leads to a true understanding
of nature and oneself than Scripture.”69 Unlike the classical and mainly pagan
philosophical texts, Scripture did not assume that reason was the dominant part
of human nature, and it was from this rather than from pagan authors that one
was to look for “the basic principles about GOD, his works and creatures, the
condition, essence and powers of humans, divine will, human felicity and the
means of acquiring it”.70
Although Thomasius in a certain sense had distanced himself from
enthusiasm, his religious views, therefore, remained highly heterodox. Doctrinal
orthodoxy was no essential element of faith, and it is not surprising that orthodox
Lutherans continued to describe Thomasius as a dangerous enthusiast and to
group him with notorious radical theologians such as Conrad Dippel (the author
of the Papismus Protestantium Vapulans), the ecclesiastical historian Gottfried
Arnold, the French mystic Antoinette Bourignon and Johann Wilhelm Petersen.71
v. faith and the reform of philosophy
It is important to realize that Thomasius’s heterodox and “enthusiastic”
religious beliefs were not opposed to his philosophical concerns but, on the
contrary, were closely related to them. They were relevant in particular to his views
on the need for a broader reform of learning. In his Cautelae circa Praecognita
Jurisprudentiae of 1710, for example, it is noticeable how faith is constantly
linked to sapientia (wisdom) in a broad sense, while false faith is identified
with foolishness (stultitia). For although Thomasius believed that philosophy
and faith were conceptually distinct and, indeed, had to be kept distinct, he also
argued that the corruption of one necessarily corrupted the other. Correcting the
orthodox views on religious faith therefore was also a necessary step towards the
improvement of philosophy and secular learning in general.
Thomasius’s deep concern with the close relation between faith and philosophy
is evident already in his writings of the late 1680s and early 1690s. There he argued
that the misguided application of philosophical arguments had led to sectarian
disputes and the decline of charity. This damaging use of philosophical reasoning
69 “Non meliorem librum vero studiosis sapientiae inveniet, qui ad veram naturae & sui
ipsius cognitionem manuducat, quam scripturam sacram” (ibid., 33).
70 “Ergo . . . noxium est, si primo erronea principia de DEO, ejus operibus & creatures, de
statu, essentia ac viribus humanis, de voluntate divina, de felicitate humana, de mediis
eam acquirendi, ex scriptoribus paganis hauriat” (ibid., 34).
71 See, e.g., G. Wernsdorfius (praeses), Johannes Reymundus (respondens), De Indifferentismo
Religionum in Genere (Wittenberg, 1707), §§LXXX-XCV, where the author includes
Thomasius in a list of religious enthusiasts.
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reflected misconceptions about the nature of both philosophy and theology and
was a sign that philosophers and theologians were overestimating the powers
of natural reason, on which philosophy was based, and were failing to realize
that theological truth could only be derived from scriptural revelation, which
was unmediated by human argument. In essence, Thomasius’s point was that
we should be content with what God had revealed and resist the temptation to
subject the divine to the scrutiny of human reason, which, while it was essential
to understanding the temporal world, was an inadequate resource for exploring
the divine.
As Thomasius’s notion of faith and his anthropology changed from the mid-
1690s, so did his notion of the relationship between philosophy and faith. Loosely,
this change could be described as a shift from a theological to an anthropological
voluntarism. Thomasius continued to emphasize the inscrutability of God, but he
now also began to stress the importance of the will rather than the understanding
in explaining human nature. The essence of the will, he now said, was not free
choice, but a desire or passion which impelled humans towards certain actions
in pursuit of particular ends, be they wealth, honour, physical pleasure (the three
ends of corrupt human nature) or the divine (the end of regenerate human
nature). The understanding was the instrument of this will-as-desire, not its
guide.
Thomasius also combined with this view of human nature a common notion
of the practical purposes of both philosophy and religion, without which all
learning, whether theological or philosophical, was mere empty pedantry.72
Clearly, this was similar to the contemporary religious concerns of theologians
like Spener, that religion should not be limited to theoretical knowledge of the
truths of faith but should be reflected in the believer’s conduct. But it also drew
on a much longer tradition of critiques of learned pedantry, which went back at
least to early sixteenth-century satires by humanists such as Sebastian Brant on
bookish learning.73
The emphasis on the practical importance of learning meant that Thomasius
now began to see the will as the main focus of his philosophy and religious
thought. He argued that attempting to educate the intellect was futile, because
the end to which the will directed human actions was prior to the processes of
72 For a discussion of Thomasius’s “practical” orientation, cf. F. Barnard, “The Practical
Philosophy of Christian Thomasius”, Journal of the History of Ideas 32 (1971), 221–46,
though Barnard interprets this practical orientation in rather modern terms.
73 G. Forster, “Charlateneria eruditorum”, in S. Neumeister and C. Wiedemann, eds.,
Respublica litteraria. Die Institutionen der Gelehrsamkeit in der fru¨hen Neuzeit (Wiesbaden,
1987). In his 1702 edition of the Introductio ad Philosophiam Aulicam published in Halle,
Thomasius included a piece by the Franeker jurist Ulric Huber on pedantry.
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the understanding. As he wrote in 1710, “foolish thoughts cannot be thrown out,
as long as the will drives the understanding towards foolish thoughts”.74
Orthodox Lutheranism, Thomasius believed, both reflected and reinforced
a basic failure to understand these central truths about human nature. The
orthodox assumed that the purpose of religion was to provide the understanding
with the correct opinions about God, the nature of justification, the merit of
Christ’s death on the cross, and so on. In other words, they assumed that learning
would be the key to salvation. As Thomasius put it, “[t]his final foolishness is
therefore the greatest of all, because it is almost incurable, and it is founded in the
universal doctrine of the schools that the felicity of man depends on the intellect.
On this basis we have said elsewhere that the learned fools are greater than all
others.”75 This error about human nature was deliberately perpetuated by the
“scholastic” orthodox clergy because it was the foundation of their authority over
the laity. It allowed them to present theological doctrine as an essential part of
Christian faith, while they claimed at the same time to be the ultimate arbiters in
all doctrinal questions. Replacing the notion of faith as doctrinal understanding
with one of faith as a purified volition, therefore, also necessitated abandoning
the emphasis on the understanding rather than the will in the interpretation of
human nature, and in philosophy and secular learning generally. The orthodox
clergy’s self-interested refusal to discard the idea that the essence of faith was
doctrinal belief was a formidable obstacle to realizing the truth about human
nature, in which, as Hume would later put it, reason was the slave of the passions
and ought to be nothing else.76
Existing accounts of human nature were fatally flawed. In his only treatise
on natural philosophy, the Essay on the Nature of Spirit (Versuch vom Wesen
des Geistes), Thomasius criticized both orthodox Lutherans and Cartesians for
defining human nature in terms of the intellect. “Man” was not a “rational
animal”, as Aristotle, the “scholastic” orthodox theologians and, in a different
way, Descartes had argued, but a being governed by volition, that is, by desires
and aversions. Thomasius then proceeded to furnish his theory of volition
with a natural philosophical foundation, derived from the universal, hermeticist
principles of sympathy and antipathy, which dictated the properties of all natural
bodies, from stones to plants and animals.77 His natural law theory in the
Foundations of the Law of Nature and Nations (1705) was based on the same
74 Thomasius, Cautelae circa Praecognita Jurisprudentiae, cap. II, §8.
75 “Haec ultima stultitia idea maxima est, quia fere incurabilis, fundata videlicet in universali
doctrina scholarum felicitatem hominis dependere ab intellectu. Unde alibi diximus
eruditos stultos esse majores reliquis” (ibid., cap. I, §50, footnote n).
76 David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford, 1978), 415.
77 On Thomasius’s natural philosophy, cf. W. Schmidt-Biggemann, “Pietismus, Platonismus
und Aufkla¨rung”, in F. Grunert and F. Vollhardt, eds., Aufkla¨rung als praktische Philosophie:
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assumption about the importance of the will-as-desire in human nature. Morality
required the reform of this will rather than the education of the understanding,
because the understanding was only the instrument for satisfying the desires of
the will and did not have the power to change human behaviour.78 As in the case
of religious faith, one of the main errors of the orthodox Lutherans’ “scholastic-
theological systems” of moral philosophy was their overemphasis on the intellect
as the key to virtue and happiness.79
The recognition that religious faith consisted in the reform of the will rather
than the correction of the understanding therefore prepared the way for true
philosophy as well as true religion. This intimate connection between religion
and philosophy is brought out particularly clearly by Thomasius’s use of the
term “wisdom” (sapientia) to describe both the state of faith and that of virtue.
Philosophy and faith were therefore not independent of each other. They were
both subordinate parts of a more general notion of “wisdom” which did not
admit the division of human existence into two mutually independent spheres of
secular life and religious belief.
vi. conclusion: a religious enlightenment?
Thomasius’s philosophy, then, cannot be understood apart from the complex-
ities of his religious thinking. Nor can his place in the early Enlightenment
be understood without reference to his ideas on the nature of Christian faith.
Religion drew him to Pietism around 1690 and was the cause of the criticism his
philosophy received from orthodox Lutherans and, later in the 1690s, from the
Pietists. Thomasius appeared to be advocating the sort of millenarian enthusiasm
that Lutherans even in the late seventeenth century associated with the Anabaptist
unrest of the Reformation era in the Holy Roman Empire. Faith as a state of the
will, which was prior to any understanding in the intellect, seemed to reduce
religious belief to a claim to divine inspiration, the truth of which was unverifiable
by any specific doctrinal standard.
Although faith and philosophy were distinct spheres, Thomasius believed that
they were, at the same time, closely dependent on each other. A false conception of
religious faith threatened to corrupt philosophy, just as much as false philosophy
threatened to corrupt religion. Orthodox Lutheran theology, with its emphasis
Werner Schneiders zum 65. Geburtstag (Tu¨bingen, 1998); T. Ahnert, “De Sympathia et
Antipathia Rerum: Natural Law, Religion and Mechanistic Science in the Works of
Christian Thomasius”, in T. Hochstrasser and P. Schro¨der, eds., Early Modern Natural
Law Theories: Contexts and Strategies in the Early Enlightenment (Dordrecht, 2003),
257–77.
78 Thomasius, Fundamenta Juris Naturae et Gentium, 4th edn, Bk I, chap. I, §97.
79 Ibid., §132, note.
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on doctrine, had led believers to overestimate the importance of the “head”
in relation to the “heart” in human nature. It produced false, “scholastic” and
pedantic learning, and neglected the true wisdom, which required humans to
recognize that the source of their moral corruption was the will-as-desire, not
the intellect. Thomasius’s argument thus was about religious truth as much as it
was about philosophical truth. His ideas did not reflect an attempt to detach the
question of religious truth from secular philosophy, as Ian Hunter has argued. On
the contrary, Thomasius believed that true faith was important for understanding
human nature and thereby for the state of philosophy in general. His indifference
to doctrine did not reflect indifference to the truth of religious belief. It only
meant that religious truth was not defined in doctrinal terms, but—no less
narrowly—as a state of the human will.
Thomasius’s “enthusiastic” emphasis on the will-as-desire and its importance
for philosophy may seem far removed from the intellectual concerns of the
Enlightenment. But Thomasius’s belief in the superiority of the pre-intellectual,
spontaneous guidance of the “heart” over the reasoning of the “head” became
a firm part of the culture of Empfindsamkeit in the Protestant German
Enlightenment. His idea that true philosophy was about the reform of the will
and the passions rather than the conclusions of the intellect was continued after
his death by the flourishing genre of sentimental literature. It was a central
preoccupation of publications such as the Moralische Wochenschriften, the moral
weeklies, which offered their readers practical advice on the guidance of their
conduct. Thomasian anthropology and moral philosophy provided these texts
with a basic view of human nature and a toolbox of arguments about the passions
which were recycled in a series of essays with advice to readers on day-to-day
moral questions.80 In this respect, Thomasius’s “enthusiastic” religious faith, via
his anthropology, contributed directly to some of the main intellectual currents
of the German Enlightenment.
The case of Christian Thomasius also illustrates the limitations of the notion
of a moderate “religious Enlightenment” which aimed to use enlightened reason
to reform theology and bring it closer to true faith.81 Faith and philosophy were
closely related to each other in Thomasius’s thought, and yet Thomasius was
no example of a “religious Enlightenment” of this kind. He did not display
particular confidence in the powers of human reason, and his concern was not to
use enlightened reason to correct theology, but to exclude the use of reason from
religious debate. Thomasius’s scepticism about the powers of human reason,
however, was not exceptional within the early Enlightenment. It is questionable
whether any significant thinker of the German Enlightenment before about 1730
80 On this see in particular F. Vollhardt, Selbstliebe und Geselligkeit (Tu¨bingen, 2001).
81 See, e.g., the important work of Sorkin, The Berlin Haskalah.
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believed that reason could be at odds with the authority of revelation and therefore
had to be reconciled with it. “Reason” in the first quarter of the eighteenth century
in Germany was in general not regarded as a critical faculty that could be the
measure of revealed truth and might even be contrary to it. The question with
which theorists of the early German Enlightenment were concerned was whether
reason could perform an apologetic function in relation to faith. That is, could
rational philosophy contribute to demonstrating and explaining the truths of the
Christian religion or not?82
Like Thomasius, Samuel Pufendorf, for example, argued that reason could
not perform this role. He too stressed the inscrutability of God’s nature and his
decisions to human understanding, and the irrelevance of rational philosophy
to the interpretation of revealed doctrine.83 The incarnation of the Son of God,
for example, “far exceeds all Reach of Humane Research, so it is not fitting
that we should dare to plunge our Curiosity further into it, than so far as the
Sacred Scripture leads us, and as may suffice to understand the Office of the
Saviour”.84 The same principle applied to the union of God and man in Christ.
All metaphors that were used to describe this relationship had to be taken “with
due Qualifications”.85
While Pufendorf and Thomasius believed that truth in Christian religion
depended on excluding rationalist argument from debates over revelation, their
contemporary Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz argued the opposite. Reason was not
distinct from scriptural argument, but a means to demonstrate its truth and
to explain its meaning. Leibniz could put forward this argument because he
believed that God was a supremely rational being whose decisions could, at
least to a limited extent, be understood by humanity with the help of its
rational powers. The difference between divine and human understanding was
not one of kind but of degree. In God’s mind were eternal, quasi-geometrical
truths, many of which were accessible to the human intellect. Humans could
use their understanding of these verities to confirm the truth of certain
revealed doctrines. This did not mean that only those doctrines that could
be explained by human reason were acceptable: God’s intellect was, after all,
infinitely superior in degree to human reason. It did, however, mean that it was
possible through rational argument to achieve a consensus on parts of revealed
doctrine.
82 On the ‘apologetic’ rather than ‘critical’ use of reason in relation to religion, see W.
Schmidt-Biggemann, Theodizee und Tatsachen (Frankfurt am Main, 1988), 61.
83 See Samuel Pufendorf, The Divine Feudal Law, ed. S. Zurbuchen (Indianapolis, 2002).
84 Ibid., §XLIII.
85 Ibid., §XLIV.
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The role of scriptural revelation was therefore diminished, but it did not
disappear entirely.86 Christ’s teachings revealed no more than the principles of
natural religion based on reason. These had been known to individual wise pagans
even before Christ, though the public religion of the pagans had always corrupted
the divine light with “ridiculous and absurd” ceremonial.87 The wise pagans had
also refrained from speaking openly about the principles of natural religion, out
of fear of being executed like Socrates.88 The role of Christ had been to promulgate
the natural religion of reason as public religion, in a form which was accessible
to lesser minds.89 When the Roman Empire converted to Christianity, this only
turned the natural religion of the wise into public religion. Reason in Leibniz’s
thought did not question the truths of revelation, but reaffirmed them.
From the 1730s a different conception of the relationship between religion
and reason began to appear. Neither Pufendorf, nor Thomasius, nor Leibniz
had believed that reason could be used to correct what had been presented
as revealed truth. Their reluctance to use reason as a critical tool with which
to examine revelation distinguished them from particular currents in German
religious thought after about 1730. These were the (probably unintended) product
of Wolffian philosophy. Christian Wolff had refrained from discussing revelation,
but he had argued that the truth of revelation, by its nature, had to be evident to
human reason.
The implications of this view became most obvious in the publication of the
infamous ‘Wertheim Bible’ of Johann Lorenz Schmidt in the mid-1730s. Schmidt’s
work was a systematic examination of the Pentateuch from a naturalistic
perspective, in which human reason became a critical instrument for examining
the truth of the text. Unlike Pufendorf, who had said that the Holy Trinity was
a mystery that could not be explained on the basis of human reason, Schmidt
wrote that it was contrary to reason and therefore absurd.90 Schmidt was no
atheist, but he argued that what had been presented as divine revelation was
86 See, e.g., Leibniz’s “Von der wahren Theologia mystica” (1695–1700): “Among the external
teachings there are two which best awaken the inner light: sacred Scripture and the
experience of nature” (“Unter den a¨ußerlichen Lehren sind zwei die das innerliche Licht
am besten wecken: das Buch der Heiligen Schrift und die Erfahrung der Natur”; quoted
in H.-P. Schneider, Justitia Universalis [Frankfurt am Main, 1967], 465).
87 P. Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence (London, 1996), 106.
88 Cf. the 1714 Vienna lectures on the Greeks, which are discussed in ibid., 107.
89 Cf. Leibniz’s “Discourse on Metaphysics” (1686), in G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Texts, ed.
and trans. R. S. Woolhouse and R. Francks (Oxford, 1998), 54-93, 89: “Ancient philosophers
had very little knowledge of these important truths. Only Jesus Christ has expressed them
divinely well, and in a manner so clear and so accessible that even the dullest minds could
understand them”; see also Schneider, Justitia Universalis, 460.
90 On the Wertheim Bible see J. Israel, Radical Enlightenment (Oxford, 2001), 552–8.
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often the product of human invention, and that natural reason could expose the
false authority of these man-made texts.91
Thomasius, however, was far from subordinating religious belief to rational
argument in this way. His aim was precisely to shield faith from the excessive
reliance on human reason and the intellect that he attributed to his orthodox
opponents. “Reason” continues to be described as the central principle of
enlightened philosophy. The examination of the relationship between faith and
philosophy in Thomasius’s works, however, shows that the meaning of “reason”
in the Enlightenment is more ambiguous than it might at first appear to be.
91 Another famous example of this new, critical use of reason to question the authority
of Scripture as an historical text was the writings of Hermann Samuel Reimarus. These
became the subject of the famous ‘Wolfenbu¨tteler Fragmentenstreit’ of the 1770s, in which
the dramatist Gotthold Ephraim Lessing played a key role. On this see H. E. Allison, Lessing
and the Enlightenment: His Philosophy of Religion and its Relation to Eighteenth-Century
Thought (Ann Arbor, MI, 1966), chap. 3.
